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Posts Tagged ‘EMV’

Selective Deregulation: What you need to know about the future of PCI validation

May 28th, 2011 2 comments

This post clarifies an earlier one Considering an Opt-Out Program on PCI Validation and helps explain how PCI compliance validation is changing based on risk measures present in the merchant’s environment.  Regulation and deregulation cycles happen in response to market forces.  In this case selective deregulation is happening in the form of reduced validation based on risk and fraud reduction measures present in merchant organizations.

Present State

When many companies think of PCI compliance they immediately think of a third-party QSA auditor.  For mature organizations this is the old way of thinking as both Visa and MasterCard permit merchants of any level to self-assess.

  • Visa (Inc. and Europe) permits a report on compliance from an internal auditor provided it is signed off by an officer of the corporation.
  • MasterCard permits self-assessments but internal auditors must “attend PCI SSC ISA Training and pass the associated accreditation program”

Although organizations must validate annually, they are relieved of this in the following  situations (as noted by Simon Sharp):

  • Visa Inc.: merchant does 75%+ EMV transactions = no requirement for ongoing external assessment (major abbreviation)
  • Visa Europe: merchants meet 1-4 milestones of Prioritized Approach are in a safe harbor even if breached (major abbreviation)
  • Visa Asia: merchants who implement end-to-end encryption or process EMV chip transactions in countries where iCVV penetration is >75% have the following options:
    • Validated compliance with milestones 1-4 of the PCI SSC’s Prioritized Approach are recognized as fulfilling Visa PCI DSS validation requirements.
    • Attested to not storing prohibited data and process EMV chip transactions in markets where iCVV penetration is higher than 75 percent – you may define merchant level by the annual volume of non-chip transactions.

Reducing Risk = Reduced Validation

Visa Inc’s Technology Innovation Program (TIP) notes organizations that reduce fraud risk using technologies such as EMV (Chip/PIN) no longer need to validate compliance annually.  Visa Europe has their own version of TIP that goes a step further to say that for merchants who validate against the Prioritized Approach 1-4, Visa Europe will:

  • waive penalties for non-compliance or non-progression
  • grant ‘safe harbour’ from penalties and allocation of incremental counterfeit fraud losses in the event of a data compromise

Sure there are caveats and I’m not certain what “allocation of incremental counterfeit fraud losses” entirely means, but the idea that a merchant will achieve safe-harbor from anything is a pretty big carrot with which to lead merchants.

Certainly the pendulum has moved from encouraging compliance to encouraging risk and fraud reduction.  To this end the Visa has changed from incentivizing compliance, via the Visa CAP program in 2007, to incentivizing risk and fraud reduction, via the Visa TIP programs in 2011.

PCI Deregulation

Perhaps it’s premature to say that PCI compliance as an industry is in a deregulation phase.  Clearly PCI compliance for regions that have not seen wide adoption such as Asia/Australia still need movement towards full compliance and validatoin.  Conversely, if a merchant has >95% of transactions using EMV (Chip/PIN) with iCVV and CDA authentication – the need for PCI compliance may be limited.

Although deregulation may never fully occur, the need for annual third-party validation is no longer necessary for companies that have either: reduced the risk to payment card data or have highly-mature internal controls and validation capabilities.

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Considering an Opt-Out Program on PCI Validation

May 1st, 2011 7 comments

Abstract

As regulation-deregulation cycles rise and fall, it is important to understand how the evolving landscape of compliance impacts your future. This post proposes maintaining compliance but making validation an opt-out optional component – a radical change from the status quo.  Evidence already suggests the industry is moving in this direction and changes to compliance are necessary for the continuance of risk management.

Please understand that when I say opt-out, I am referring to mandated external, third-party validation requirements. I think internal validation is more important than ever.

Special thanks to idea people: @lennyzeltser, @mckeay, @alexhutton, @kindervag, @joshcorman

Background

I recently read Lenny Zeltser’s blog titled “Could Regulatory Compliance Encourage Weaker Security?” This is a valid question and one that needs addressing. The question can be rephrased as, “Who does compliance work best for?” To answer that question we need to understand why compliance exists.

In a blog post I wrote on How Compliance Regulations Gets Made we focus on the natural regulation-deregulation cycles and how they exist in response to an increase or decrease in data breach/loss. The ultimate goal of compliance is to set a baseline of standards within an industry. The question Lenny raises is one I’m often asked by opponents of such standards, “what about the big/little guy (who do not fall within the Bell Curve norm for best practices)?”

It’s true that regulatory compliance is targeted not only at setting a minimum standard for technical security (firewalls and IDS) but also a minimum standard for security maturity (policies and procedures) within an organization. So let’s think about this graphically. There are four quadrants within which to place organizations: those with either high/low-level of security and high/low-level of maturity.

Security vs Maturity

For the purpose of this conversation let’s assume that maturity encompasses the Check and Act aspects of the PDCA Cycle and security refers to the Plan and Do components. The reason I break it down this way is to directly reflect the results of the Verizon PCI Compliance Report (PCIR). This report found that:

“Organizations are better at planning and doing than checking. If the check phase is broken, they cannot act to maintain the state of security over time.”

The Verizon PCIR found that organizations are great at Planning and Doing but not great at Checking and, as a direct result, Acting on those changes. To me this disconnect is the difference between organizations with a high-level vs low-level of maturity within their security practice.

With this in mind, let me suggest that regulatory compliance standards should most impact those organizations with a lack of either security or maturity, but not both. So let’s break this down and the types of organizations they embody.

  1. High-Security / Low-Maturity: These companies care about security but have never documented policies and procedures. They have log management systems but have slowly stopped reviewing them. Regulatory compliance can have a positive impact here.
  2. Low-Security / High-Maturity: These or organizations run well but with little funding for sorely needed security projects. There has never been a “hammer” to drive spending. Regulatory compliance can have a positive impact here.
  3. Low-Security / Low-Maturity: These are organizations that do not care about security or compliance. Perhaps they are too small (mom-and-pop companies) or those that will validate compliance but never maintain it through the year. There is no changing these companies and little that compliance can do for them. Validating compliance for them is a waste of time and money and since there is no driver to maintain a state of security.  (Instead new technologies such as tokenization, end-to-end encryption, and validated payment applications will have the highest impact here.)
  4. High-Security / High-Maturity: These are companies at the top-tier of their breed. They don’t manage security, they manage risk! They adopt and implement custom risk management solutions based on careful analysis of data classification and impact analysis reports. These companies see regulatory compliance as a roadblock and implementing industry “best practices” as a deviation from their perfect path.

I propose that regulatory compliance will most help groups 1 and 2, but not groups 3 and 4.  (Unless you consider regulatory compliance the driving force for said technologies above, though I would argue data breaches and word of mouth have a higher impact here than compliance.)

Although I believe in the need for increased education, flexibility of controls, and more data for risk modeling – I’m going to save us a bit of time and skip to the chase.

  • Companies in group 3, who do not care about compliance or security, will not change their tune by forcing them to validate compliance.  Instead the end result will most likely be in them checking a box and ending up in the 80% of companies (see: Verizon PCIR) that do not maintain their state of compliance.
  • Companies in group 4, who care passionately about risk and security, need a reprise from continually validating against a standard that is built for the average individual. Although, the stated way to address this for PCI compliance is through documenting a set of Compensating Controls, what other options do we have out there? What other ways are there for such companies dealing with compliance validation?

Remember, the stated goal of regulatory compliance, taken from regulation-deregulation cycles, is to reduce the number of data breaches and data loss. In both groups 3 and 4, continual validating against a standard may, in my opinion, have little to no impact on the number of data breaches/loss. The reason is that group 3, though validating will not maintain that validation, and group 4, treat validation as an exercise in documentation.

Other Options

On February 6, 2011, Visa launched its Technology Innovation Plan (TIP) “to recognize and acknowledge merchants in Visa Inc. regions outside of the United States that have taken action to prevent counterfeit fraud by investing in EMV technology.” (Since Visa Europe is a franchise, the “outside the US” may only apply to Asia-Pacific and Latin-America & Caribbean, but it’s a bold change we should view as the tip of an iceberg.)

In essence, they are saying that organizations that have achieved the following, need not continue to validate their compliance against the PCI DSS standard:

  • Implemented a sufficient level of controls so as to reduce fraud* (see: EMV)
  • Validated their state of compliance once
  • Have not suffered a data breach

* Yes, fraud is discernibly different from data breaches but one leads to the other and as a result are interconnected.

Wow, what an innovative approach. I’ve talked about the TIP program with industry insiders and they are mostly in agreement that we don’t know if this will result in positive or negative changes. I feel it will be a great success and here is why.

Opting Out of Validation (Not Compliance)

Presently companies that validate their state of compliance need to submit two things: a validation document (either a self-assessment questionnaire or a report on compliance) and an attestation of compliance (AOC) document. The AOC is nothing more than a memo that reiterates that organizations commitment to following the payment-brand rules for protecting payment card data.

I think organizations that choose to opt-out of compliance validation should still need to sign the Attestation on Compliance (AOC) to reaffirm their social contract and commitment to protecting payment card data. If they fail to achieve this within their, alleged, super-robust security and risk program then they deserve to undergo the same forensic review and financial implications that come with any other organization. If they instead achieve in protecting payment card data and are able to repel the wily-hacker then they should continue their reprieve from annual compliance validation (perhaps they can externally-validate every 2 or 3 years).

The reason I suggest this is because, and here’s the kicker, you cannot tell the difference between a PCI compliant organization and one that has let security and compliance lapse until they experience a data breach. Until that point, both organizations appear, from the outside, to be operating in the same manner.  (Sure, you can tell a difference internally, but so far very few organizations that achieve compliance once organically maintain it year-over-year.)

But Wait – It Already Exists

The PCI Council has already rolled out the Internal Security Assessor (ISA) program and MasterCard has begun listing this qualification as part their validation program requirements.

“Effective 30 June 2011, Level 1 merchants that choose to conduct an annual onsite assessment using an internal auditor must ensure that primary internal auditor staff engaged in validating PCI DSS compliance attend PCI SSC ISA Training and pass the associated accreditation program annually in order to continue to use internal auditors.”

(Ok, so Visa has not adopted the same stance and companies that store, process, or transmit payment card data for both brands must adhere to the minimum standard for both, but still it’s a change.  Also, the payment card brand validation guidelines are guidance for the acquiring banks who have the ability to manage their validation programs on a case-by-case basis.)

This means that many organizations (there are exceptions) who wish to opt-out of formal validation can do so leveraging their internal assessor team.

Conclusion

What we have is a directional movement towards, what I will call, selective deregulation. Step 1 is the PCI SSC ISA program.  Step 2 is the Visa TIP program.  What is the next step? The only way to know is to wait and see.

I’m not proposing that we do away with validation entirely, but instead that we move into a hybrid approach towards validation that is based on risk, maturity, pas performance, and future commitment.  The market has spoken and the Council and payment brands are already responding.

My suggestions for you?

If you fall into category 1, 2, or 4 above – prepare the following:

If you fall into category 3 above – investigate the following:

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The Real Deal on Chip and PIN (EMV) in the US

May 29th, 2010 No comments

As many of you know EMV, or more commonly referred to as Chip and PIN (Chip/PIN), have been a long time structure in areas such as Europe and most of the Asia-Pacific region.  Europe made the transition between 2001 to 2006.  Canada has a mandate of October 2010 for implementation and the intra-region liability shift.  The US it seems is now entering the came with a few very small but significant moves.

So will this bring us all the safety and security we want?  What will this change mean for cardholders and retailers?  Those are more complicated answers and the answer really varies from one region/country/bank to the next.  Here’s a few things that Chip/PIN changes do mean.

Liability Shift

If you read the Visa OpRegs you’ll see three different listings for liability shift.  Merchants that accept Chip/PIN transactions are not always liable for fraudulent transactions since the understanding is that they are asking for both a card and the PIN (something allegedly only the cardholder knows.)

These shifts in liability can be either domestic, intra-region or bilateral shifts (according to Visa).  MasterCard says of domestic liability shifts, “A shift in liability to the non-EMV compliant party, fraud liability is born by non-EMV complaint party for all regional transactions.  Bilateral shifts existed previously between the various Visa Regions, “Visa EU and CEMEA signed a bi-lateral agreement in order for the liability shift rule to apply for international transactions between both regions as soon as the CEMEA rule went into effect on January 2006.”

This shift takes the liability off the merchant, but who does it go to?  Well according to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) in the UK that handles consumer complaint disputes, it is the bank that is responsible for the fraud unless customers acted “without reasonable care”. This could include writing down a PIN or allowing someone else to use a card.  What does this really mean?  Well, banks around the world are struggling as consumers claim fraud and the banks claim “without reasonable care.”

Risky Business

In a ComputerWorld article, analyst Avivah Litan, says that “companies such as Visa and MasterCard should consider easing some of their security requirements for U.S. merchants willing to make their payment systems EMV-ready. Visa has reduced the scope of its security audits in cases where organizations have implemented EMV technologies, and the same could be done in the U.S”

Pardon? (Fallacy alert!)

Let’s remember that Chip/PIN only helps reduce fraud at a singular merchant, it does not reduce the instance of payment card data theft.  In fact Chip/PIN transactions can be just as risky as magnetic stripe transactions from a data theft and skimming perspective.  Chip/PIN cards used as a payment terminal may leave “track equivalent data” which cannot be used to recreate the Chip but could be used to re-encode the magnetic strip on the back of traditional cards.  I mentioned this in 2008 and Gartner is still saying the same thing.

Conclusion

The US moving to Chip/PIN is a good thing and something that will drive down card-present fraud.  It may not directly impact payment card data theft and thus will not detract from PCI DSS compliance. I remember teaching a PCI DSS class of QSAs (back then CISP assessors) in the UK back in 2006.  They struggled with the problem that merchants in the UK thought they didn’t need PCI DSS compliance because they already had adopted Chip/PIN, something they already equated with “credit card security”.  I blogged about this from 2006 – 2007 to explain the differences between Chip/PIN and PCI DSS compliance and risks.

Companies that adopt Chip/PIN will still need to comply with the PCI DSS.  That being said, there are some benefits:

  • Reduced interchange (in some instances)
  • Reduced fraud (as measured in the UK by APACS)
  • Liability shift for Chip/PIN transactions

Links

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Rise of the Merchant Class

May 12th, 2010 No comments

Although you may know me more for my musings on traffic theory and becoming immortal, this post focuses on the increasing ease of exchanging money within our daily lives.

In the Beginning

You see, in the beginning was the bank and the bank stored all the gold.  Accessing the gold required going to the bank and withdrawing it for use in the market place.  As new modes of communication evolved the methods of exchanging money became easier and easier.  You now have ATMs replacing banks for dispensing cash, e-commerce replacing brick-and-morter, and PayPal replacing Western Union.  (Ok, so perhaps replaced is a strong term, instead these services supplemented the older forms of exchanging funds.)

Throughout time one thing that held true was the relationship between the merchant and the consumer.  The merchant was typically a company and the consumer an individual.  Common area market places such as eBay helped break down the walls and enabled individuals to sell items to other individuals, but still these required a virtual store front.

New Merchant Class

The term merchant is slowly being democratized in the open market place as individuals accept and exchange digital funds through fluid, simple, and inexpensive methods.  There are a number of factors that influence this new merchant class, so let’s go into a few.

  1. Increasing number of Payment Service Providers: The affect of Web 2.0 and social media applications have catalyzed the marketplace for new methods of exchanging money in both a virtual environment (Facebook, Second Life, Zynga) and via emerging payment methods (Spreedly, PayPal PayFlowPro, iPhone applications).  The lines between the individual and the merchant are blurring to the point that exchanging funds can be done more fluidly than ever before.
  2. Increasing number of payment integrators: With this increase in the number of payment service providers comes a wave of new businesses that aim to support the new merchant population.  With new merchants come new point of sale third parties who wish to sell them services and support.  More and more service providers are appearing with an ever greater list of services they are offering to the new merchant class.  Each of these new services providers may act as a vector or path through which an attacker can access payment data.
  3. Becoming a merchant is easier than ever: In addition to the new methods of accepting payments, merchants can go mobile faster than ever.  Instead of accepting cash only at the local farmers market, the new merchant class will gladly accept major payment cards via their Square or VeriFone PAYware enabled iPhone.  This level of service, once reserved for more established merchants, is now being disseminated into the hands of the masses.
  4. Chip and PIN increasing: Chip and PIN or EMV has seen great successes in reducing card present fraud in Europe and Asia.  This technology recently jumped-the-pond and was adopted for implementation in Canada.  It’s only a matter of time before merchants in the US begin to see Chip and PIN technology rolled out to their personal cards and then to their retail locations.
  5. Cost cutting is key: Previous approaches to compliance were via the mass adoption of security technology.  These days merchants are more cost conscious and agile in their approach towards compliance and security.  The new merchant class calls for reduced costs through new technology such as point-to-point encryption and “tokenization”.  They are happy to exchange the flexible use of payment data for the security and cost savings of scope reduction.  They are looking for overlapping regulatory controls to kill multiple birds with one stone.  They don’t want point solutions but instead comprehensive approaches towards security.  They want strategy, flexibility, and mobility instead of “solutions”.
  6. Training and education needed: In order to achieve these goals: adopt new technology, reduce scope, and leverage internal employees there is a great demand for education and how they can achieve all this.  The need is stronger than ever for an educated merchant class who understand the tradeoffs and can make strategic decisions that balance not just compliance but also business directions.

Future of Electronic Money

Today we see the break down from traditional models and democratization of technology that equips and enables mobile merchants.  Taking this to its natural evolution we will next see the seamless move towards person-to-person transactions where exchanging money is as simple as taping your mobile phone against that of another.

  • Want to split the dinner bill five ways? Put all your cell phones back to back and shake them in unison and the bill plus tip is split five ways and paid!
  • Do you owe your friend $10? Pay them via email!

The barriers of exchanging proverbial gold are dissolving and those that enable this new future will be the ones who survive and rise to the top.

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