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How Compliance Regulations Get Made

March 23rd, 2010 No comments

In April 2010 I’ll be at SOURCEBoston on a panel discussing how compliance regulations get made.  This got me thinking about how to explain in simple terms such a complex series of events.  I’ve previously discussed the question of “why” regulatory compliance is important and it’s relation to vaccinations.  Here I’d like to discuss the “how” of regulatory issues.

(If you’d like to hear about this and other PCI related issues then register for the BrightTALK PCI Compliance Summit on March 25, 2010.)

There are so many debates about the pros and cons of regulatory compliance but they all focus on the individual and not the population as a whole.  In fact, the best way to model and examine the evolution of regulation and deregulation is through the eye of the scientist examining the entire population of players.

Background:

Let’s take a look at the history of regulation and deregulation.  The following are a few industries that have experienced both regulation and deregulation over the years, but the list may as well also include industries such as agriculture, telephone, communications (radio, TV, cable), medical and pharmacy.

  • Airline
    –Civil Aeronautics Board (1937)
    –Airline Deregulation Act (1978)
  • Railway
    –Interstate Commerce Commission (1887)
    –Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (1976) / Staggers Rail Act (1980)
  • Trucking
    –Motor Carrier Act (1935)
    –Motor Carrier Regulatory Reform and Modernization Act (1980)
  • Energy
    –OPEC price hikes (1973)
    –Emergency Natural Gas Act (1977)

Each of these industries experienced a need for regulation and eventual deregulation in order to keep in check the potential for large problems that could impact large numbers of people (e.g. monopoly, poor conditions, unbound risk, lack of consumer protection).  In 1935 Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act that gave the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) authority to regulate trucking involved in interstate commerce.  When the confines of this regulation outlived it usefulness the tides turned.  From 1971 until the eventual passage in 1980 politicians worked to remove barriers to entry into this industry and finally passed the Motor Carrier Regulatory Reform and Modernization Act.  This migratory pattern of regulation and deregulation occurs regularly in many industries.

Pattern of Data Loss

It is no surprise to anyone that there is a building momentum of data loss.  We can gather individual statistics from the news or get detailed statistics from DataLossDB.org.  Either way we notice a pattern of attacks and rising numbers of data breaches that make us ask, is the situation getting better or worse?  Is what we are doing having the desired effect?

It’s very difficult to answer that question since the problem is multi-factorial, but there are signs that things are getting better.  As fraud shifts from one industry to another and one method to another we are slowly driving it from the system.  (This type of analysis does not as easily apply to authentication/identity fraud, but may very well when it comes to system infiltration and data exfiltration techniques.)  For example, we see attack vectors moving from one method to another and from one geographic region to another.  Attackers originally stole data from flat files but when those were encrypted the attackers began capturing data as it traversed the network.  When this was encrypted they began installing custom malware to capture data in memory.  Slowly the system are moving from system protection, to network, to software, and finally hardware protection.

As protection system such as Chip-PIN were implemented across Europe and Asia we saw a drop in card present fraud as the attackers moved to online and e-commerce fraud (via UKPA or APACS).  The attackers adapted to the system and moved on to other low hanging fruit.

History of Regulatory Time

I can’t really do justice to replicating the work of David Lineman, of  Information Shield, so I’ll simply reference his paper “A History of Regulatory Time” and reference his graph showing a timeline of security privacy-related regulations.  Take a look and map the regulations below against the major data breaches of recent and we begin to notice the correlation of regulation in reaction to the rise in tide of data breaches.

Inflection Points and Traffic Jams

Simply analyzing data breaches and their respective reactionary regulation doesn’t paint a precise picture of how the regulations are formed, only that they are somehow correlated.  To understand this we need to first understand a little about math.  Inflection points are the change in slope from an increasing value to a decreasing value or vice versa.  In terms of data breaches we can consider if the number of data breaches, though currently increasing, has a slope that is increasing or decreasing.

Andy Grove, founder of Intel, said in his book Only the Paranoid Survive that “An inflection point occurs where the old strategic picture dissolves and gives way to the new.”  We need to focus on this inflection point in order to understand and if the increasing numbers reflect a state of growth or decline in a system, which we are (unfortunately) only able to measure over time.

In fact, this concept is familiar to physicists in the term “hysteresis“.

For example, consider a thermostat that controls a furnace. The furnace is either off or on, with nothing in between. The thermostat is a system; the input is the temperature, and the output is the furnace state. If one wishes to maintain a temperature of 20 °C, then one might set the thermostat to turn the furnace on when the temperature drops below 18 °C, and turn it off when the temperature exceeds 22 °C. This thermostat has hysteresis. If the temperature is 21 °C, then it is not possible to predict whether the furnace is on or off without knowing the history of the temperature.

The question we always ask is “Where are we on the Sine Wave of Pain?“  Is the rate of negative events increasing or decreasing?  The only way to know is gather and map data as well as measure trending patterns in the industry and make calculated estimates as to which it is.

One thing for sure is that the population not the individual is what drives regulation and as such it is the population that examined the rising data loss numbers and determines when they want change.  It is this demand for change that ultimately initializes the regulation engine to affect what the individual cannot directly.

Traffic Patterns and Modeling

Still, all we have shown at this point is that a culmination of actions can result in change brought upon by the populous.   How that change is enacted is an area of great interest and one that draws from, of all things, traffic patterns.  Before getting into that I’d like to reflect on different types of phase shifts seen both in nature and fiction.  We are all familiar with the concept of ice melting into water which freezes into ice.  It was Kurt Vonnegut who in his book Cat’s Cradle first proposed the fictional concept of Ice-Nine.  This was said to be a polymorph of water that freezes at 45.8 °C (114.4 °F) instead of 0 °C (32 °F).  The idea being that ice could maintain its ice form even at room temperature which is around 20 °C  (68 °F) to 25 °C (77 °F).  In the book, it would take only a single fragment of “ice-nine” to come in contact with the ocean and they would all instantly freeze.  This shows how a seemingly stable system can react suddenly when given the proper catalyst.

A common method of modeling traffic patterns is the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model.  (For more detailed information on this model I recommend reading Traffic Simulation using Agent-Based Modelling by Andrew Lansdowne.)  The diagram to the right shows this model in that the traffic flow (y-axis) is measured against the traffic density (x-axis).  You can see that as the traffic density increases the traffic flow increases.  This continues until point “A” where we reach the critical density.  This is the density at which a chance can occur but not at which it must occur.  If everyone continues driving along at the same rate the density can increase until a critical event occurs that breaks down the system.  An example could be one person applying the breaks which then causes the person behind them to do the same, and on and on.  Point “B” is the moment at which the critical event occurs.  At this point we see the traffic flow decrease representing the slowing of traffic until the density is so high it stops (point “D”).

One interesting feature of this series of events is that the traffic flow pattern will always exist in a cycle moving from point A to B, to D and back to A in that order.  Traffic will never go from D to B because doing so requires it to first traverse A.  Remember that term hysteresis?  In the book Critical Mass by Philip Ball he states, “A state of traffic depends not only on its density but on its history – on whether it was previously denser or less dense.  As the traffic rate rises and then falls, the flow rate follows a loop.”

We can examine the graphical flow of data in another form by mapping space on the road (x-axis) against time (y-axis).  As you can see in the second diagram, we map the position of each vehicle over time.  Until the density decreases the traffic jam will continue.  Here the traffic jam is visible in the very dense points as a diagonal across the diagram.  Once the density decreases we once again see a greater flow of traffic.

What’s the Solution?

As you can see, modeling traffic patterns can be very similar to the regulation and deregulation of an industry.  So what is the solution to an increase in incidents that push us past the critical density?  Contrary to initial though the solution to high traffic is not to simply build more roads.  In fact, Richard Moe, Head of the US National Trust for Historic Preservation, once said “building more roads to ease traffic is like trying to cure obesity by loosening the belt”.  Simply applying ‘more’ security does not mean you achieve ‘better’ security.

I propose the following approaches:

  • Help prevent data sprawl :: Security is required where data is maintained.  Does your environment reflect the “data, data, anywhere” or “data, data, everywhere” philosophy?  Do you know where all your data is? Does it exist in more locations than is necessary?  Check these items and set measurable actions to correct it.
  • Examine use cases :: While medical record data requires persistence, payment card data is only used once and then not ever again.  The use cases are simple enabling a flexible set of measures to secure the data.  If your business model does require retention of data then examine what data you are retaining and make sure it’s as benign as possible.
  • Brute force is effective but costly, while the elegant solution is simple and secure :: Have you ever considered replacing the data you retain with a reference number instead?  I recommend you read up on technologies such as point-to-point encryption and tokenization.
  • Solve tomorrows problems with today’s technology :: Problems are not hard if you know which ones to solve.  I recommend absorbing and comparing as many of the data breach reports (more) you can to determine what emerging attack patterns exist in your industry and how to prevent them.  If you are only able to implement one set of technology each 10+ years then make sure it solves tomorrows problems and not yesterdays.
  • Plugging one hole doesn’t save the levee :: Reducing card present fraud drives attackers to e-commerce.  Reducing fraud in one country drives them to others.  Only a holistic solution will work on such interconnected systems.  This is one of the arguments for industry regulation.

3 Habits of Highly Effective Regulation

In the end there are three attributes, or habits, that make regulation effective in achieving adoption and acceptance.

  1. Education, education, education :: This is the single most effective method of driving adoption.  People want to know how to interpret, implement, and adopt the regulation to their business model.  I’ve seen more people fail to start because they didn’t know where to start than anything else.  People want to know if they can use a $0.10 piece of duct tape or if they need to replace the entire engine of the car.
  2. Flexibility of controls :: This is an attribute of so many regulations due to the fact that they apply to such a range of companies, industries, size of organizations and the like.  Remember that 100% compliance is not the goal when system failures occur in groups.  The PCI DSS has what’s called “compensating controls.”  The EU Data Protection Directive has the “comply or explain” concept.  Even the ISO 27000 series do not mandate 100% adherence to each and every control.
  3. More data for Risk Modeling :: Let’s consider this without getting into a debate over Frequentist vs. Bayesian statistics (as I’ll leave that to Alex Hutton).  The more data we have the more closely we can make educated decisions about how to evolve the standard, protect against failure, and make deterministic decisions about how to proceed.  More data will help us understand when we have reached an inflection point and ultimately determine when the rising regulation turns toward deregulation.
Slide 10

that freezes at 45.8 °C (114.4 °F) instead of 0 °C (32 °F)
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Holistic Information Security: From Risk to Diligence and Back Again

March 14th, 2010 8 comments

I am a big proponent of risk management and risk-based security.  I also work (mainly) in a very specific, yet large, segment of information security that pertains to the payment card industry (PCI).  Since I’ve been involved in this space for a long time I sometimes suffer from the curse of knowledge.  This helps when analyzing information and determining which is valuable and which is not.

Two weeks ago at Mini-Metricon, Pete Lindstrom said, “we have solved the problem of information security over 200 times, the problem is we don’t know which one is right.”  He went on to explain that different people are experts in their own domain.  The curse of knowledge hits me in that of all the information available in the payment card industry, I know which is useful to me and which should be discarded or is more applicable to another individual.  I do this without thinking and as a result my mental concept of risk management is shifted from that of others in the general public.  My network includes a strong background in the PCI industry of over 6 years and the opportunity to work closely with many smart people including Alex Hutton, Adam Shostack, Branden Williams, Walt Conway, Paul Guthrie, Andrew Jamieson, Anton Chuvakin, Lucas Zaichkowski, Martin McKeay, and many many other industry experts.  Having access to this holistic source of information provides me a wealth of information that others may simply not have.  (It also helps that my job involves QA and I end up reading hundreds of reports or case studies every year.)  Also, it’s not a point in time, but I call upon these individuals all the time to help shape and crystallize my understanding of the ever changing landscape of risk.

Two years ago when I met up with Adam Shostack at RSA and as we talked about the industry he explained to me that what we need as an industry is more data in order to form proper conclusions.  The main idea being that the more data you have on a specific topic the more easily you, and everyone else, can make a rationale decision about how to best protect it.  The problem with the lack of data is the ability to trust the limited data and conclusions you want so very much to rely on.

This is why when I finally met up with Donn Parker I asked him to explain his concept of diligence-base security vs risk-based security [PDF].  In a nutshell, Donn explained that risk-based approaches are nothing more than data alchemy as there is simply not enough public data available to make any sort of statistically significant conclusion when you assume that the entire population of data breaches or security failures (realistically unknown) is vastly larger.  Indeed it is very difficult to measure and make statistical decisions about the unknown-unknowns.

The example I like to reference is that of scanning for rogue devices (i.e. wireless access points) on a computer network.  Detecting rogue devices (unknowns) is very different than examining known devices, and logic breaks down when trying to apply traditional sampling methods to this unknown landscape.  Traditionally, sampling of a population is done when the population is uniform, or in some way known.  In general, the more uniform the population the smaller the sample size may be to determine a statistical conclusion.  The problem with rogue devices is that the population is unknown.  If you try to sample from an ever changing population the results you get at any point in time may be statically non-reflective of the total population.

Mr. Parker advocates that since we do not have a population of data breaches significant to the total number, and since the total number and type are ever changing, there is no scientific way to apply risk-based controls.  Instead he advocates a diligence-based approach towards security.  Since we cannot measure and thus appropriately apply risk-based metrics we should take the agreed upon “best practice” controls we have and be diligent about their application and maintenance.

Arguably, one could take the same cynical approach towards the traditional baseline “best practice” baselines such as BS7799, ISO 27001, ISO 27005 (for that matter the entire ISO 27000 series), or even HIPAA (HHS guidelines), or GLBA (FFIEC guidelines).  How do we know that these are sound practices upon which we should build an information security program?  With technologies changing and evolving over time there are many different ways to envision security.

So if we cannot base our foundation on best practices, and we cannot apply risk-based controls, what then is left?  This is where I propose holistic information security.  The diligence method is based on factors such as budget, management directives, staff talent and availability, and organizational policies.  Although this sounds right from a business perspective, following these methods provides a ‘good enough for the current business’ which may or may not be the best direction for the business to protect itself.  Arguably, one cannot know what the best direction is for the business due to lack of data.  See also, chicken-and-the-egg.

I’ve watched over the years as analysts, experts, and individuals claim to have the correct answer, when in fact all they have is their one piece of the pie of truth.  Instead, I advocate taking a holistic approach towards security and assimilating as much data as you can before making a decision.  Talk with as many stake holders as possible so you can elevate your level of knowledge about your industry from amateur to expert.  Only by reviewing others’ piece of the pie can you approach seeing the bigger picture.  In fact, Donn Parker advocates this in his ISSA Journal 2008 paper by proposing that practitioners of the art of information security seek out other sources of information from other organizations of comparable size, type, structure, and threat exposure.

If we are actually dealing with an unknown-unknown that we cannot measure or (honestly) see the entirety of, then we are left with only one option.  The only option left is to assimilate as much of the whole as we can.  The goal should be to “seek first to understand and then to be understood“.  This approach enables us to make more informed decisions about what is valuable information and what is fodder.

Update: I also highly recommend you watch Alex Hutton’s Security B-Sides talk on, Risk Management – Time to blow it up and start over? [slides]

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Why fear the analyst?

March 9th, 2010 2 comments

Someone turned me on to this article on fearing the auditor which made me think of other information sources we might fear.  The author of that article claim there are three types of auditors: the good, the bad, and the ugly (ok, so I paraphrased.)

Variance in individual quality should be no surprise since we see this in just about every industry.  There are a range of skills in just about every profession including penetration testing, auditing, and yes analysts.  So let me propose that there are three types of analysts:

  1. Polar Bears: These are people who believe that polarizing the conversation is the best way to improve the industry.  They are masters of the catch phrase and speak only in sounds bites.  They survey a few people and make bold statements that reflect only one segment of the industry.  What they lack in substance and facts they make up for in cliches.
  2. Gold Mine Speculators: These are people who do not know what the actual answer is but they speculate, typically in 5-10 year projection statements.  They may be correct 25% of the time but that’s good enough.  If they are correct people call them visionaries; if they are not they pick a new industry and re-speculate.
  3. Educators: They understand that there is no one simple answer but that solutions are custom made and long term collaborations.  They are not in the news as much since they are not making polar speculative claims, but they help bring a holistic analysis of the options and present the pros/cons with every statement.

I like analysts but believe that in every profession one should “seek first to understand and then to be understood”.

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